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Abstract
Recently, therehas been considerable interest in identifying the exogenous policy actions of the Fed and a
number of identification methods have been proposed. This paper deals with one of these, namely, using
nonborrowed reserves in a recursive structural vector autoregression (VAR). A number of researchers
[Christiano, Eichenbaum andEvans (1994ab, 1996, 1997), Evans andMarshall (1997), Strongin (1995),
Pagan andRobertson (1995) and Brunner (1994) findevidence of a statistically significant liquidity effect
using nonborrowed reserves in a VAR. The success in finding the liquidity effect with nonborrowed
reserves in the VAR is attributed to innovations to nonborrowed reserves reflecting supply shocks while
innovations to total reserves primarily reflect shocks to demand. The purpose of this paper is to
demonstrate that the opposite is true. Evidence of the liquidity effect in recursive structural VARs
depends critically on the existence of a negative covariance between the federal funds rate and
nonborrowed reserves. Under a variety of operating objectives, the TradingDesk of the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York has offset changes in bank-initiated discount window borrowing when implementing
the Federal Open Market Committee’s policy directive. This practice has created a negative
contemporaneous covariance between nonborrowed reserves and the funds rate that has been incorrectly
attributed to the liquidity effect. Once the Desk’s practice is accounted for, there is no evidence of a
statistically significant liquidity effect.
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The liquidityeffect — thedecline in real and nominal short-terminterest rates associated with an
unanticipated expansionary monetary policy — which plays a central role in theconventional view
of thetransmission ofmonetary policy, has been elusive [e.g., Cagan and Gandolfi (1969),
Melvin (1983),Mishkin (1982), Thornton (1988b),Reichenstein (1987) and Leeper and Gordon
(1992)]. It is generally believedthat the lackofempirical support forthe liquidityeffect stems
from a failure to isolate the exogenous policy actions ofthe Fed. Recently, a variety ofmethods
foridentifyingtheexogenous policy actions ofthe Fed have beenproposed.’ This paperdeals
with one ofthese, namely, using nonborrowed reserves in recursive structural vector
autoregressions(VARs).
A numberofresearchers [Christiano, Eichenbaumand Evans (1994ab, 1996, 1997),
Evans and Marshall (1997), Strongin (1995), Pagan and Robertson (1995) and Brunner (1994)]
find evidenceofa liquidity effect in recursive structural VARs using innovations to nonborrowed
reserves as the policy shock. Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1996, p. 18), argue that this is
because,“innovations to nonborrowedreserves primarilyreflectexogenous shocksto monetary
policy, while innovations to broadermonetary aggregates primarilyreflect shocks to money
demand.” Thepurposeofthis paper is to demonstrate that the opposite is true. Ishow that under
a variety ofoperating objectives, freereserves, the federal funds rate, borrowed reserves and
nonborrowedreserves, theTradingDesk has implementedthe Federal OpenMarket Committee’s
‘Romer and Romer(1989) and Boschen and Mills (1992) usethe narrative approach. This
approachhas been criticizedby Hoover and Perez (1994) and Bernanke and Mihov (1997ab).
Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and Sims (1986) prefer innovations to the federal funds rate, which
has been criticizedby Faust (1997), who attempts to side step the identification issue, and
Cecchetti (1995). Rudebusch (1996) has criticized the entire VAR approach. Forthe response to
these criticisms, see Sims (1996).The Federal Reserve’sOperating Procedure, Nonborrowed Reserves,Borrowed Reserves and the Liquidity
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(FOMC’s) policy directive, innovations to nonborrowedreserves reflect both supply shocks and
the Desk’s reaction to demandshocks. Hence, the negative covariance between the federalfunds
rate and nonborrowed reserves, upon which evidence ofthe liquidityeffect in recursivestructural
VARs depends, is due either to theliquidityeffect orthe endogenous response ofthe Fed.2
A model ofthe TradingDesk’s operating procedure in implementingtheFOMC’s policy
directives is developed. Using this model, I show why under a variety ofoperating
objectives—free reserves, the federal funds rate, borrowedreserves and nonborrowed
reserves—theTrading Deskhas offset changesin bank-initiated discount windowborrowing.
The model reveals howthe practice ofoffsettingdiscount windowborrowing produces a
negativecontemporaneous covariance betweennonborrowedreserves and the funds ratethat is
independentofthe liquidity effect.
After presentingevidence that the Deskhas acted to offsetbank-initiated changes in
discountwindowborrowing, evidence is presentedfrom a variety ofsources showing that this
practice created the negative contemporaneouscovariancebetween nonborrowed reserves and
the funds ratewhich has been incorrectlyidentifiedas the liquidity effect. In addition, I show
whythe “liquidity effect” in the VAR vanished [Pagan and Robertson (1995) and Christiano
(1995)] in the mid- 1980s, and whythe period ofnonborrowedreserves targeting is so important
forempirical estimates ofthe liquidityeffect [Pagan and Robertson (1995)].
2Acontemporaneous negative covariance is not required forsimultaneous structural VARs.
Forexample, by imposing overidentifyingrestrictions, Gordon and Leeper (1994) decompose a
small positive correlationbetween innovations to total reserves and the fundsrate into a negative
estimate ofthe funds rate elasticityofreserve demand. Gordon and Leeper’s results are
somewhatfragile. Also, see Pagan and Robertson (1998) for a critical analysisofthe liquidity
effect obtained by Gordon and Leeper and othernonrecursive structural VARs.The Federal Reserve’sOperating Procedure, Nonborrowed Reserves, Borrowed Reserves and the Liquidity
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2. The Trading Desk’sOperating Procedure
While thePolicy Directive ofthe FOMC tothe Trading Desk has undergone a
metamorphosis, it hasalways been nonspecific and deliberately so [see Meulendyke (l99O)].~It
has beenthejob ofthe TradingDesk ofthe FederalReserve Bank ofNew York to translate the
unspecific policy directiveinto specific open market operations. In general, directives have
contained a reference to money market, credit market or reservemarket conditions. Forexample,
since 1983 the operationalphraseology has been to increase, decrease ormaintain thedegree of
pressure on reserve positions.
Given that open market operations directly affect the supply ofreserves, it is not
surprising thatthe TradingDesk has implemented the FOMC’s policy directive by monitoring
and attempting to alter various measuresofreserve market conditions — free reserves, borrowed
reserves or the federal funds rate [Meulendyke (1990)]. These measureshave served both as
indicators ofreservemarket conditions and as intermediateoperating targets.
Overthe years, the emphasis placed on one oranother ofthesemeasures in evaluating
and implementing monetary policy has changed. From the Accord to theearly 1970s, the
emphasis was on free reserves. Fromthe earlyto late 1970s, the emphasisshifted to the federal
fundsrate. From the late 1970s to theearly 1980s,nonborrowed reserves was used. In theearly
1980s borrowedreserves became the intermediatetarget/indicator. By the mid-to late-1980s, the
emphasis had shiftedback to the federal fundsrate. These shifts in emphasis in implementing
the FOMC’s policy directive aregenerally referred to as changes in the Fed’s operating
3TheFOMC broke this practice in August 1997 when itchangedthe wording ofits policy
directive to include an explicit target forthe federal funds rate.The Federal Reserve’s Operating Procedure,Nonborrowed Reserves, Borrowed Reserves and the Liquidity
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procedure. While suchchanges are considered to be significant,they have a relatively small
effect on thefundamental way the Desk operates.
One reason why such changesin emphasishave a relatively small effect on Desk
operations is that theseindicator/target variables arehighly interrelated. Forexample,
Meulendyke (1990) notes that theborrowedreserves operating procedureis essentially the same
as a free reserves operating procedurewhen excess reserve demand is stable. Thornton (1988a)
has shown the equivalence betweenborrowed reserves and federal funds rate targeting when the
demandforborrowedreserves is stable.
Perhaps the most significant change in theDesk’s operating procedure occurred in 1979
when nonborrowed reserves became theDesk’s focus in implementing the FOMC’s policy
directive. To see a morebasic reason why suchchanges in emphasis have arelatively small
effect on Desk operations and to see the effect ofthe 1979 change, consider the following
structural model ofthereserve market. The demand forreserves, Rd, is derivedfrom the demand
forreservable depositliabilities ofbanks and the demandforexcess reserves. Hence, total
reserves, TRd, demand is given by,
TRId = t[f(i1, x1) + v~], (1)
where idenotes a short-terminterest ratethat represents theopportunity costofholdingsuch
deposits, x denotes a vectorofthe otherdeterminants ofthe demand, v denotes an iid random
innovation and t, 0 < t < 1, denotes the reserverequirement which the Fed imposes on banks.
Open market operations directly affect the supply ofreserves. For simplicity, assume that
the r.h.s. of the Fed’s balance sheet consists solely of reserves and that the l.h.s. is composed ofThe Federal Reserve’s Operating Procedure, Nonborrowed Reserves, Borrowed Reserves and the Liquidity
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threeitems, theFed’s holdings ofgovernment debt, B1, borrowed reserves, BR1, and a composite
factor, F1, thatreflects a number of other factors thataffect reserve supply, e.g., Treasurybalances






Banks meet theirreserverequirements on average over a maintenance period.4
Consequently, on average over themaintenance period the followingcondition must hold
t[f(i,,x1) + v1] =B1 +BR, +F1. (3)
Because the Deskdoes not knowprecisely the demandforreserves, it has relied on various
measures ofreservemarket conditions. Forexample,ifreserve supply wasinadequate, banks
might reducetheirholdings ofexcess reserves, increase discount window borrowingor both, i.e.,
free reserves would decline. Hence, free reserves was used both to gauge reserve market
pressure and to implement monetary policy in the early post-Accord years. The emphasis placed
on various measureschanged with the Fed’sbelief about the informationsuch measures
conveyed about reservemarket conditions. For example, the federal funds rate wasnot used asa
primary gaugeofreserve stringency until the 1970s. This was due in part to the factthat, prior to
that, the discount rate was an effective ceilingforthe federal funds rate. Once the funds rate rose
4Themaintenance period wasone week forlargebanks and two weeks forsmall banks prior
to February 1984 and two weeks forall banks since. Moreover, prior to theMonetaryControl
Act of 1980 not all banks,let alone all depository institutions, were subjectto these same
requirements.The Federal Reserve’s Operating Procedure, Nonborrowed Reserves, Borrowed Reserves and the Liquidity
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to the level ofthe discount rate, itceasedto provideadditional information about the degree of
reserve market pressure. Hence, itwas believed that better information about reserve market
pressure could be obtained from the behavior ofborrowing and excess reserves.
With theexception ofthe Fed’s holdings ofgovernment debt,the Deskdoes not know all
ofthe factorsthat affect supply at the time it must act. Consequently,itrelies on estimates and
assumptions. To see how this basic procedure is implemented, consider Feinman’s (1993, p.
234) description of theFed’s current operating procedure:
Each day thestaffestimates theperiod-averagedemandfor
reservesby projecting required reservesagainst deposits and the
desired excess reserves ofthebankingsystem. Subtracting the
FOMC-spec~fied level ofdiscount window borrowingfrom this
forecast ofreserve demandyields thenonborrowed reserve path,
the Desk’sprimeobjective. Each morning the staff’sforecast of
nonborrowed reservesowing to marketfactors beyondtheFed’s
control (for example, Treasury balancesat the Fed, float, etc.) is
subtractedfrom thepath to produce an estimate ofthequantity of
reserves thatmust be added orsubtracted, on a period-average
basis, to reach theobjective.
According to Feinman, theFed’s projected holdings ofgovernment securities, B*, orwhat he
calls the Fed’s nonborrowedreservespath, is:
= tE1 1f(i1, xt)!i[* — BRAS1
— E1 ,F1 (4)
where Er1 denotes the expectation operatorconditional on information up to the start ofthe
period,f denotes theFed’s target forthe federal funds rate and BRASdenotestheFOMC’s
borrowedreserves assumption. When B is less thanB*, thereis a need to add reserves, whenB
is greaterthan B*, there is a need to drainreserves.
Discount windowborrowingis done at the initiative ofbanks. Inter alia bankborrowingThe Federal Reserve’sOperating Procedure, Nonborrowed Reserves, Borrowed Reserves and the Liquidity
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depends on thespread between the federal funds rate, i1, and the discount rate, id. Thatis,
BR1
= ~(if — .d ~) (5)
where r~ represents all other factors that determiningborrowing. For simplicity, assume that F is
partitioned into atime-dependent component, ~ and a randomerror, c~,
F1=ji1÷ 1. (6)
Toderive an expression for the nonborrowed reserves path, assume thatthe Fed sets its





Furthermore, assume that theFed’s forecast ofotherfactors that affect reserve supply is
E11F1
= . (8)
Substituting Equations 5-8 into Equation 4, yields an expression for the nonborrowed
reserves path,B*~The actual quantity ofreserves supplied, however, is
R1S = B1* + BR1
+ F1
Substituting in forB* yields a general representation for reserves:
TR1
5
= tE1 I(i1, x1)Ii[* + (1 — ~)~(i( — ~ r~)+ . (9)The FederalReserve’s Operating Procedure,Nonborrowed Reserves,Borrowed Reserves and the Liquidity
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= tE1 ,f(i1, xj)Ii[* — E~i~(i/ — i/’, q) + . (10)
Equation 10 shows that nonborrowedreserves is necessarily negatively relatedto thepart of
borrowingthat theFed offsets. The portion ofborrowingthat the Fed does not offset is reflected
in total reserves.
Feinman’sdescription ofthe current operating procedureis based on targeting the funds
rate, but the basicprocedure is independentofthe Fed’s operating objective. For example,
during the periodofnonborrowedreserves targetingopen market operations were directed at
achieving a specific growthrateformoney, solong asthe funds ratestayed withina relatively
wide band, frequently 400 basis points or more. To this end, the staff madean estimate oftotal
reserves requiredto achievethe FOMC’smoney growth objective, called thetotal reserves path.
To arrive atthe path for nonborrowed reserves, the Desk subtracted its estimate ofbank
borrowing, thencalled the initialborrowing assumption, 1BA.5 Hence, instead ofestimating the
demand forreserves consistent with a target forthe federal fundsrate, the reserves objectivewas
based on the FOMC’s target formoney growth.6
5Meulendyke (1990, p. 467) notes that the staffestimates ofborrowingwere made from a
modified versions ofstaff’s moneydemand models and borrowedreserves equations. Inthese
equations, borrowedreserves wasdetermined primarily by thespread betweenthe federal funds
and discount rate. The Fed acknowledged, however, that theseestimates took “into account the
actual borrowingin previous weeks.” Federal ReserveBank ofNewYork (1981), p. 64.
6The details ofthis operating procedurewere carefully spelledout by the Fed atthe time, e.g.,
Gilbert and Trebing (1981) and references cited therein. The typical operating directiveforthisThe Federal Reserve’sOperating Procedure, Nonborrowed Reserves, Borrowed Reserves and the Liquidity
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When borrowing differed from its estimate, the Deskcould either ignore it andmiss its
money stock objective, oroffset it. Later it is shown that the Deskfaced this situation frequently,
and frequently chose to offset unexpectedborrowing rather thanmiss theFOMC’s money growth
objective.
3. ForecastInnovations for Total and Nonborrowed Reserves
To derive theforecast errors forNBR and TR, the model is simplifiedby assuming
flu1, x1) = — Ai1
+ yx1 and BR1
= a(i/ — i1”) +
Letting i = t, theforecast errors for TR and NBR are [see the appendixfor thecompletereduced
form],
u1,. = ilc[E~ + (l—~)r~, + (1—~)?C1~v1]





These expressionsare quite different and somewhat morecomplicatedthan those
postulated by Strongin (1995) andBemanke and Mihov (1997ab).7 Moreover, unlike theirs,
period instructed the Desk to supply reserves consistent with the FOMC’stargets forthe annual
growthrates ofvarious monetary aggregates, with a provison that the federal funds rate traded in
a specified range, usually400 basis points ormore.
7Strongin asserts that the forecastinnovations fortotal reserves, utr, and nonborrowed
reserves, unbr, can be expressed as,The Federal Reserve’s Operating Procedure, Nonborrowed Reserves,Borrowed Reserves andthe Liquidity
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supply shocks are reflected in innovations to both NBR and TR.8
More importantly, demand shockscan show up in innovations to TR, NBR or both,
depending on theextent to which the Fed offsets borrowing. The larger is ~, the more demand
shocksare reflected in NBR and the less they are reflected in TR. Forecast innovations to TR are
independentofdemand shocks iftheFed completely offsets borrowing, i.e., ~ = 1. The reason is
straightforward. A shock to demandraises the equilibrium funds rate, causingborrowingto rise.
The Fed offsets the rise in borrowing with an open market sale, therebyreducing NBR by this
amount. Theeffect ofthedemand shock on TR is neutralized, but the shock is completely
reflected in NBR, butwiththe opposite sign. If, on the other hand, the Fed ignored the rise in
borrowing, the reverse would be true; thedemand shock would be reflected positively in the





where Vdand v5 are assumed to be independent shocks to demand and supply, respectively.
Strongin defines ~ to be the“operatingproceduredetermined split in the accommodation
betweenborrowedreserves and nonborrowedreserves in responseto a reservedemand shock.”
The structure proposedby Bernankeand Mihov (1997ab) is somewhat morecomplicatedthan
that suggested by Strongin, however, itretains Strongin’s feature that utrdoes not depend on v5.
8That supply shocks arenecessarily reflected in innovations to TR is easy to see. An
exogenous open marketpurchase increases total reserves unless borrowingfallsby an amount as
largeorlarger thanthe Fed’s open market purchase. Baring an unprecedentedresponse in
borrowing,supply shocks willbe reflected in both nonborrowed reserves and total reserves.
9Christiano (1996), argues that if theFed offset demand shocks to the economy, such as those
consideredby Coleman, Gilles and Labadie (1996), “NBR and TR would be negativelyrelated.
This implication is at variancewith the data.”(p. 6). Christiano’s analysis ignores the Fed’s
operating procedure. Note that NBR and TR need notbe negatively correlatedin thecase where ~The Federal Reserve’s Operating Procedure,Nonborrowed Reserves,Borrowed Reserves and the Liquidity
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The Identification ofthe LiquidityEffect in the VAR
Measuresofthe liquidity effect in recursivestructural VARs depends on the




Cov(uNBR, u1) = ~i[(t?~.Y2~(l —~)a~ — (t?~)’o~ — ~2ai~ja2]
Ifthe Fed does not offset borrowing, i.e., ~ = 0, Cor(UTR , u1)maybe either positive or negative.
The negativecovariance associated with the liquidity effect, i.e., shocksto , may be offset
totallyorpartly bythe positive covarianceassociated with shocks to demand and borrowed
reserves.’0 On the otherhand, the Cor(uNBR, u1) will be strictly negative solely because ofthe
liquidityeffect.
If, otherthe other hand, the Fed completely offsets borrowing,both covariances are
strictly negative. The Cor(uTR, u.) is strictly negative because ofthe liquidity effect. The
Cor(uNBR, u1) is strictly negative forthis reason and becauseofnegativecovariance associated
= 1, i.e., Cov(NBR, TR) = (l+cz)2o~ >0. The positive covariance stems from the fact that both
NBR and TR depend on shocks to supply.
‘°It should be noted that the effect ofa supply shockon the interestratedepends on the
interest sensitivity ofborrowing, a. If~ = 0, the effect of a pure supply shockon the interest rate
would be -1I(tA + a), the “liquidity effect” which Bernanke and Mihov (1997ab) claimto be
identifying. If~ = 1, however, the effectofa pure supply shock is - 1/t?~.,the “liquidity effect” of
Gordon and Leeper (1994). Thesetwo liquidity effects are identical if and only ifa =0. Note
too that this liquidity effect could be identifiedusing either NBR or TR; however, the set of
conditioning variables would be different.The Federal Reserve’s OperatingProcedure, Nonborrowed Reserves, Borrowed Reserves andthe Liquidity
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with the effect ofshocks to demandon borrowing which theFed offsets. The lattercovariance
stems from theFed’soperating procedureand the factthat borrowingvaries positively with the
funds rate. In this case,the negative covariancebetweenNBR and the funds ratewould be larger
than that associated with the liquidity effect alone.
The Presumptionofa Liquidity Effect
The structural model presentedabove assumes the existenceofa liquidity effect.
Specifically, Equation 1 assumes that the demand forreservable deposits is negativelyrelated to
the interest rate, The alternativethat thereis no liquidityeffect is impossible. Consequently, it is
important to show that the Fed’s operating procedure and discountwindow borrowingcan
combine to producea negativecovariancebetween nonborrowed reserves and the federal funds
rateeven when therecan be no liquidityeffect.
A sufficient condition forthe absence ofa liquidityeffect is to assume that the interest
rateis independent ofFed actions.” Ifthe federal funds rateincreases independentofpolicy
actions, Equation 10 shows that borrowingwill increase and NBR will fall if~~0. The rise in
the federal funds rate causes borrowingto increase which theFed offsetsby reducing
nonborrowed reserves through open market operations. Hence, therewill be a negative
covariancebetween NBR and thefunds rate, evenif thereis no liquidity effect. The degree ofthe
association depends on themagnitudes ofboth ~and a. If~~0, themagnitudeofthe negative
“Coleman, Gilles and Labadie (1996) also make this point and make the interest rate
independent ofpolicyby simplyassuming that the interest rate is determinedsolely by real
factors, independent ofmonetary policy. Another motivation is thebuffer stock notion ofmoney
demand [e.g., Laidler(1984) and Carr, Darby andThornton (1985)], which argues thatcostly
information makes individuals slowto adjusttheirmoney holdings.The Federal Reserve’s Operating Procedure, NonborrowedReserves, Borrowed Reserves and the Liquidity
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association betweennonborrowed reserves and the funds ratebecomes larger the larger is a, and
vanishes ifbanks simply stop coming to the discount window.
The implication oftheabove analysis is this. If~0 , the negative covariance between
NBR and the federal funds ratecan eitherbe the resultofthe liquidityeffect ortheFed’s
operating procedure. In the lattercase, the negativecovariance will disappearwhen banks quit
borrowing orwhen borrowingis unresponsive to changes in thefunds rate, i.e., a =0. Ifthe
negativecovarianceis due to the liquidity effect, however, it willnot disappearwhen banksstop
borrowing orwhen a = 0. Furthermore, if~ = 1 andifthere is a liquidityeffect, thereshould be a
negative covariancebetweenthe federal fundsrate and both NBR and TR. In this case, evidence
ofa liquidity effect canbe found using TR ratherthan NBR in the VAR.
4. Doesthe Fed Offset Changes in Borrowed Reserves?
The extent to which innovations in NBR or TR reflect exogenous supply shocks critically
depends on howBRASis set. To make this point clear, see what happens when Equation 7 is
replaced with:
BRAS1
= ~a(i[* — i1~’) . (7’)
Equation 7’ differs from Equation 7 in that itasserts that the Fed offsets only aportion of
borrowingthat it anticipates given its target forthe funds rateas before. Shocks to demandcause
the funds rateto deviate from thetargeted level as before. So long as the funds rate target is
unchanged, however, the Fed would not offset the change in borrowing associated with the
demand shock,even if~= 1. Demand shocks would be reflected in TR and not in NBR [see theThe Federal Reserve’sOperating Procedure, Nonborrowed Reserves,Borrowed Reserves and the Liquidity
Effect, Page 14
appendix fordetails].’2 It is also clear from Equation 10 thatNBR would be negativelyrelated
only to BRAS. Shocks to borrowingwould show up in TR, which would be eliminated fromNBR
whenborrowing is subtracted.
This fact provides thebasis fortesting the extent to which the Fed has offset changes in
borrowing and, simultaneously, obtaining an estimateof ~. This is done by estimating the
equation:
ANBR1
= ô - ~ABRAS1
- ~‘t~NBRAS1
+ ~, (~)
where borrowing is partitionedinto BRASandNBRAS, where NBRAS = BR - BRAS.
Ifthe Fed does not attempt to offset shocks to borrowedreserves, ~‘ should be zero.’3 If
theFed attemptsto completely offset changes in borrowing, theestimate of ~‘ should be
insignificantly different from unity. Moreover, ifthe Fed offsets all ofborrowing, the hypothesis
that ~‘ = = 1 should not be rejected.
Figure 1 shows theFed’s BRASthe period 1982.01-1996.12, alonewith adjustment
borrowing,AB, and seasonal borrowing, SB. There is considerable month-to-month variation in
BRAS, suggesting that intra-monthadjustments were frequently made to keep BRASclose to the
observed level ofadjustment plus seasonal borrowing. With adjustmentborrowingbeing all but
non existent in recent years, BRAS has beenkeptclose to seasonalborrowing.
‘2The key reason forthis result is thatthe borrowing assumption is fixed, so theDesk only
offsets aconstant proportion of borrowing.
‘3The reducedform forNBRincludesthe Fed’s estimateofthedemand forreserves
conditional on its fundsratetarget and othervariables that arenot directlyobservable. The first
difference is usedto lessen theinfluence oftheseomitted variables on theparameters ofinterest.The Federal Reserve’s Operating Procedure, Nonborrowed Reserves, Borrowed Reserves andthe Liquidity
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Data on BRASarenot available prior to 1982; however, dataon the Fed’s target forthe
funds rate areavailable for theperiod 1974.10 - 1979.09. Consequently, estimates ofBRAS
consistent with thefunds rate target forthis periodcan be obtained by estimating the equation
BR1
= a + y(FFT1-DR1 ) + ~11 (12)
where theforecasted values ofBR representBRASand theestimated errors representNBRAS.
Threeinterest rates are used: thefederal fundsrate, FF, which is a weighted average of
rates on daily transactions fora group offederal funds brokerswho reportto the Federal Reserve
Bank ofNew York; the discountrate, DR, which is theratethat is in effect from the day that
discount ratechangesare first announced; and theFed’s federal fundsratetarget, FFT, which is
provided by theFederal ReserveBank ofNew York. Data on FFT areavailable from 1974.10 to
1979.09 and from 1984.02 to 1996.12. All ratesare monthly averages ofdaily figures.
Borrowed reserves, BR, are seasonal plus adjustment borrowing. The current practiceof
classifying borrowing into extendedcredit, seasonal and adjustment borrowingbegan in May
1973. Prior to that, all borrowing is adjustmentborrowing. NBR are TR less adjustment and
seasonal borrowing.
Estimates ofEquation 11 are presented in Table 1. Estimates of ~‘ are significantly
different from zero and thenull hypothesis that ~ = ~‘ is not rejected at the 5 percent significance
level during both periods. Moreover, the null hypothesis that ~ = ~‘ = 1 is not rejected. The
results support Strongin’s (1995)claim, based on his own analysis and that ofMeulendykeThe Federal Reserve’s Operating Procedure, Nonborrowed Reserves, Borrowed Reserves andthe Liquidity
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(1990), that since 1959 the Fed has acted to offset mostif not all changes in borrowed reserves.’4
That the Fed offsets changes in borrowed reserves is less surprising thanit might first
appear. The borrowing functionhas been unstable [Clouse (1992, 1994) and Thornton (1988a)].
Consequently, even if the Fed wantedto offset only that part ofborrowingassociated with the
fundsrate target, doing sowould be difficult. Moreover, the Deskhas opportunity because each
day itknows the level ofdiscount window borrowingforthe previous day. Hence, offsetting
borrowing is relatively simple at maintenance-period ormonthly frequencies.
That theDeskoffsets changesin borrowing that are not reflected in its borrowing
assumption maybe surprising. It is important to remember, however, that the specific
quantitative components ofthe operating procedureare meant to provideguidance. What the
Deskchooses to do depends on a numberofthings, including larger thanexpected borrowed
reserves.’5
‘4The fact that there is a nearly one-to-onenegative relationship betweenNBR and BR
suggests that theDesk treated borrowingas a factoraffecting reserve supply ratherthan reserve
demand. Ifthe Deskinterpretedchanges in borrowing or free reserves associated with changes
in borrowing as a factorthat affecteddemand, itwould haveincreased the supply of
nonborrowed reserves in response toa change in borrowing. That it did not, is probably due to
the fact that during muchof theperiod lagged reserve accounting wasin effect. Under lagged
reserve accounting, reservedemand was determinedby deposit liabilities in an earlyperiod.
Changes in borrowing would have been seen as increasing the supply ofreserves relativeto an
unchanged reserve demand. Hence, it is only natural the Deskmoved to offset changes in
borrowing. The incentiveto do so under nonborrowedreserve targetingwas even greater.
‘5This is dramaticallyillustrated by the Continental illinois Bank experience. Borrowing by
Continental illinois was initially classified as adjustmentborrowing, ratherthan extended credit
borrowing. Consequently, in May adjustment borrowing increased by $1.71 billion, a good
portion ofwhich was borrowingby Continental illinois Bank. In MayNBR decreased by $1.59
billion, despite the unchangedBRASof $1 billion. When continued borrowing by Continental
illinois was reclassifiedextended credit borrowingin June, adjustmentborrowingdeclined by
$1.59 billion and NBR increased by $1.88 billion. Again, theBRASwas unchanged.The Federal Reserve’s Operating Procedure, Nonborrowed Reserves, Borrowed Reservesand the Liquidity
Effect, Page 17
The estimates suggest that ~ 1. Additional evidenceon themagnitude of~ can be
obtained by analysis ofthe funds rateand the funds rate target. It can be shown that the funds
rate equals the targeted rate plus arandom error onlyif ~ = 1 [see theappendix]. Hence, an




and testing the hypothesis that ~ = 1. Figure 2 shows that during periods offunds ratetargeting,
thefunds rate equals the funds rate target on average. Indeed, ordinaryleastsquares estimates of
the fundsrate on the funds ratetarget, presented in Table 2, indicate that therates areequal up to
a random error.’6 Theseresults suggest that ~= 1, during theperiods offederal funds rate
targeting andborrowedreserves targeting.
Estimates ofthe Liquidity Effect
Historical analyses ofthe Fed’s behaviorand the evidence presentedabove indicate that
the Fed has fairlyroutinely offset borrowing in the course ofimplementing the FOMC’s policy
directive. Moreover, theprevious analysis suggests that under this condition, only supply shocks
should be reflected in innovations to TR, while innovations to NBR should reflectboth supply
and demandshocks. In this case, thereshould be a “liquidity effect” using either TR or NBR, but
its estimatedmagnitude should be larger with NBR, since it also reflects theFed’s practice of
offsettingdemand-shock induced changes in borrowing.
To investigate theliquidityeffect in the recursivestructural VAR, Pagan and Robertson’s
‘6Nearly identical results are obtained using the Johansen (1988)method.The Federal Reserve’s OperatingProcedure, Nonborrowed Reserves, Borrowed Reserves and the Liquidity
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preferred specification is used. This specification has six variables, the industrial production
index, Y, theprice level, P. as measured by theConsumerPrice Index, CPI, the Journal of
Commerce commoditypriceindex, JOCCP, NBR, FF, and TR. With the exception ofJOCCP,
these variables arethe same as those usedby Pagan and Robertson (1995).’~Because there is a
linear relationshipbetweenborrowedand nonborrowedreserves, thevariables are in levels.’8
The period is 1959.01 to 1996.12.
Acausal interpretation is achievedby imposing a Choleski recursiveordering. In
particular, to interpretthe impulse response function (IRF) forNBR-~~FF as evidence ofa
liquidityeffect, NBR precedes FF in the Choleski ordering. Contemporaneous innovations to
NBR that areuncorrelated with the variables that precedeitaretaken to represent exogenous
policy shocks.’9 To estimatethe liquidityeffect using NBR, the standardCholeski ordering, {Y,
P. JOCCP, NBR,FF, TR } “, wasused. The order ofthe lag is indicatedby thesuperscript at the
‘7The commodity priceindex usedby Pagan and Robertson, the industrial countrycommodity
priceindex from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics, was discontinued in July 1995.
Results nearly identical to those obtained by Pagan and Robertson are obtained using JOCCP
over theperiod 1959.01-1993.12.
‘8The IRFs using logs or levels arequantitatively and qualitatively similar.
‘9Strongin argues that shocks to supply “canbe identifiedby simplyhaving TR immediately
precede NBR in a standard Choleski decomposition.” He argues further that“it would be useful
to have an explicit measureofthe mixbetweenNBR and TR as aprimaryobjectiveofstudy,
since it is this mix that is viewed asthe policy control variables.” He appears to suggest thatthe
relationship betweenNBR and BR can be accounted forif both TR andNBR areincluded in the
VAR andif theyare normalizedby dividing both by the level ofTR in thepreceding period. The
rationale forthis normalization is neverprecisely stated, and Strongin tried several alternatives.
In general, one should be very careful using ratios that arenot well specified by economic theory,
see Kuh and Meyer (1955). In any event, whetherNBR or the mix variable is usedis relatively
unimportant in that theresults arevery similar as when NBR is used, e.g., see Pagan and
Robertson (1995).TheFederal Reserve’sOperating Procedure, Nonborrowed Reserves, Borrowed Reserves and the Liquidity
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end oftheCholeski ordering.20 To estimatethe liquidityeffect using TR, thepositions ofNBR
and TR are switched,i.e., the Choleski ordering, { V. P, JOCCP, TR, FF, NBR} ‘~,was used. The
estimated IRFs forthese two orderings are presentedin Figure 3 along with 90 percent
confidence intervals obtained by bootstrapping the model using 500 iterations.2’
Given that ~is close to unity, innovations in TR that are uncorrelated with V. P. and
JOCCP should reflectthe federal fundsrate’s response to exogenous supply shocks.
Consequently, the lackofa statistically significantIRFfor TR-’~FF suggeststhat there is no
liquidity effect. The IRF forNBR-FF is negative and statisticallysignificant, however. The
analysis ofthe Fed’s operating procedure reveals that the negative IRFforNBR-~FF couldresult
either from the liquidityeffect or theFed’s practiceofoffsetting changes in borrowing.
Moreover, the lackofa significantliquidity effect for TR suggests that the IRFforNBR-~FF is
entirely due to theFed’s behaviorand not the liquidityeffect.
5. The Source of theNegative CovarianceBetween the Funds Rateand NBR
The purposeofthis section is to provide further tests ofthe previous finding that the
negative and statistically significant IRF withNBR is do tothe Fed’s operating procedure and not
to the liquidityeffect. In so doing, answers to two questions that have arisen in the literature are
provided. The questions are,whydid theliquidity effect vanish afterthe early l980s [Pagan and
20The order ofthe lag is relatively unimportant. Qualitatively and quantitatively similar
results are obtained with much shorter lag lengths. Nevertheless, followingPagan and
Robertson, the lag order is set at 14. As is typical in such studies, the lag lengths arethe same for
all variables;however, this requirement is unnecessarily restrictive [Thornton and Batten (1985)].
21The IRFs reported here arefor normalizedunits ofthe variables ratherthan standard
deviations. The reason forthis approach willbe clear later. Iwould like to thank John
Robertson forprovidingme with the bootstrapping algorithm.The Federal Reserve’sOperating Procedure, Nonborrowed Reserves, Borrowed Reserves and the Liquidity
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Robertson (1995) andChristiano (1995)] andwhy is the period of nonborrowed reserves
targeting soimportant [Pagan and Robertson (1995)]?
Recall that if the negativecovariance betweenNBR and the funds rateis due to theFed’s
operating procedure, and not to the liquidity effect, itwillvary with a, being largerthe larger is a
and disappearing when a=0. Hence, the importantfinding in this section willbe that the
negative, significantIRF forNBR-~FF disappears when a 0. To better understand why this is
true, it is useful to see that the IRFforNBR-FF is due to the contemporaneous relationship
between NBR and FF. Do see this, considerthe following structural model,
AY=BY,+~, (14)
where the elementsofAarethe structural parameters, while theelements ofB representthe
dynamic responseofthe structure to exogenous shocks, including monetary policy shocks. The
Choleski orderingassumes that A is lower triangular. Because A is full rank, Equation 12 can be
rewritten as
y = j’y, + ~ (15)
where I’ = A’B. Successive backward substitution yields,
I = A~. + FA’~. + F2A’c -2 f... + F”A1~
,, +... (16)
Differentiating 16 with respectto ~, assuming a once-and-for-all change in ~ yieldstheThe Federal Reserve’sOperating Procedure, Nonborrowed Reserves,Borrowed Reserves and the Liquidity
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system ofimpulse response functions: 22
(17)
8
In general, the i ~th element,j <i, of A’ is not equal to the i, jth element ofA. Therefore,
in general, it is not thecase that the contemporaneous response in Equation 17 is largejust
because thecorresponding coefficient in A is large. However, given the recursive structure ofA
and thenormalizations, i.e.,the diagonal elements ofA are unity, it is thecase that the ~, jr” j <~,
element ofA” is equal to minus the i, ~th , ~ <~, elements ofA fori-j=l. This is important
becauseNBR immediately precedes FF in the Choleski ordering. In any event, when these
conditions are satisfied, the initial responseofthe IIRF from Equation 17 is exactlyequal to the
ordinary least squares estimate ofthecoefficient on NBR in theFF equation in Equation 14.
Because ofthe persistence in thesevariables, the estimate ofthecoefficient on NBR in the




+ ~, . (18)
To show that estimatesofthese parameters are not only ofsimilar order ofmagnitude but have
evolved similarly over the sample period, Figure 4 presents rolling least squaresregression
estimates of?~ and f3 forthe entire sample fora window of60 observations. These coefficients
behave quite similarly and are nearly identical since thelatter part ofthe 1970s. Hence, theIRF
22The impulse response functions are what Theil and Boot (1962) referredto as “dynamic”
and “final form” multipliers.The Federal Reserve’sOperating Procedure, Nonborrowed Reserves, Borrowed Reserves and the Liquidity
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fornonborrowed reserves is associated with the contemporaneous relationshipbetween LiNBR
and LIFF. This is particularly true since the late 1970s.
What is equally remarkable, and more important forunderstanding the source ofIRF for
NBR-FF in therecursivestructural VAR, is that theestimates of ~3 are very similar to estimates
of -( from theequation:
tIFF1
= (tIBR1
+ , . (19)
Rolling leastsquares regression estimates of -( and ~3fora windowof 60 observations are
presented in Figure 5. Not only do thesecoefficientsfollow a similar pattern, but theyhave been
nearly identical sincethe late 1970s and have been essentiallyzero in recent years.
The magnitude ofthe initial liquidity effect is determinedby the contemporaneous
relationshipbetween the funds rateand NBR, which is closely associated with the
contemporaneous relationship betweenthe funds rateand borrowing. Hence, it is importantto
consider how banks have used the discount window. Figure 6 shows the spread between the
federal funds and discount ratesand SB and AB over theperiod 1959.01-1996.12. During the
earlypart ofthe period,the discount ratewas an effective ceilingforthe federal funds rate.
When market conditions were suchthat the fundsrate wasbelow the discountrate, most banks
met theirovernightfinancing needs in the funds market. Whenmarket conditions changed and
the fundsrateroseto thelevel ofthediscount rate, many banks turned to the discount window.23
In the mid-1960s things changed. The funds rate went abovethe discount rateand has
23The fact that some borrowingoccurredwhen thediscountratewas above the federal funds
ratesuggests that some banks maylack access to the federal funds market.The Federal Reserve’s Operating Procedure, Nonborrowed Reserves, Borrowed Reserves and the Liquidity
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generallyremainedabove it since. Meulendyke (1990)suggests that therelationship between
theserates changed when largebanks began using the federal funds as a permanent source of
funds to lend.24 In any event, with the fundsrategenerally abovethe discount rate, borrowing
began to rise and fall with thespread betweenthe funds rate and thediscount rate. As before,
however, discountwindow borrowingall but ceasedwhen the spread became negative.25
There was a markedchange in the banks’ useofthe discount window in themid-l980s,
whenborrowing dropped offdramatically. Clouse (1992, 1994)shows that the change in
borrowingwas due to a change in the behavioroflargebanks,which significantly curtailedtheir
use ofthe discountwindow. Clouse argues that this suddenchange in behaviorstemmed from
large banks’ concern aboutbeing seen at thediscount window in the wake ofthe large borrowing
by then troubledContinental illinois Bank. This hypothesis is consistent with anecdotal evidence
suggesting that manylargebanksdo not want to be seen at thediscount window.26 Whatever the
reason, banks significantly changed theirbehavior about this time.
Ifthe significantrelationship betweenthe funds rate and borrowing, coupled with the
24Meulendyke (1990), pages 36-7,states that “there was considerable surprisewhen thefunds
rate first rose above thediscount rate,briefly in October 1964 and morepersistently in 1965. As
largebanksbecame more activemanagers ofthe liability side oftheirbalance sheets, they
borrowed fundsin the market in a sustained way.. . .Borrowing from otherbanks through the
Federal funds market were free ofreserve requirements and interest rateceilings. Furthermore,
theywere not subject to therestrictions on prolongedusethat were applied to the Federal
Reserve’s discount window.”
251t is this feature of borrowing that accounts for much of the reportednonlinearity in the
borrowing function [e.g., Peristiani (1991)].
26Conversations with reserve account managersoftwo very largeU.S. banks support Clouse’s
interpretation. Both indicateda strong reluctance by senior management to be seen atthe
discount windowhas kept them away.The Federal Reserve’s Operating Procedure, Nonborrowed Reserves,Borrowed Reserves and the Liquidity
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Fed’s operating procedureexplainsthe negative contemporaneous relationship betweenNBR and
thefunds rate, the relationshipshould vanish whenever the relationship between borrowingand
the fundsratebreaks down. On the otherhand, ifit is due to a true liquidity effect there is no
reason that it should vary with the banksuse ofthe discountwindow.
Pagan and Robertson (1995) and Christiano (1995)have already shown that the IRF of
NBR -. FFvanished about the time that largebanksbegan to shunthe discount window.
Borrowingwas also relatively unresponsive to changes in the funds rateduring the period when
the discountratewas an effectiveceiling forthe funds rate. During this period, the spread
between the federal funds and discount rate was like a toggle switch. When the fundsrate
equaled the discount rate, banksborrowed. When the fundsrate wasbelow the discount rate,
borrowing all but ceased. Ifthe interest responsiveness ofborrowing and the Fed’soperating
procedure account forthe liquidityeffect with NBR, it should vanish during this period as well.
The sensitivity oftheestimated liquidityeffect to the banks’ useofthe discount window
is illustrated in Figures 7 and 8. Figure 7 shows the IRFforNBR -‘ FFfor { V, P. JOCCP, NBR,
FF, TR}4 for 1965.04-1984.06 and 1965.04-1979.09. The liquidity effect is relatively large and
statistically significant during theperiod 1965.04-1984.06, when borrowingwas relatively large
and responsive to changes in thefunds rate/discountrate spread. The liquidity effect is
somewhatsmaller when the 1979-82period is excluded, confirming Pagan and Robertson’s
(1995) findingoftheimportance ofthe 1979-82 period.
Figure 8 shows the IRFforNBR - FFfor {V, P. JOCCP, NBR, FF, TR}4forthe periods
1959.01-1965.03 and 1984.07-1996.12. The estimated liquidityeffect essentially vanished after
1984.06, when large banks turned away from the discount window. The IRE forthe periodThe Federal Reserve’s OperatingProcedure, Nonborrowed Reserves, Borrowed Reserves and the Liquidity
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1959.01-1965.03 also suggests no liquidityeffect. The immediate response is largebut short
lived and the lIRE is generally insignificant.27 The results forthese periods are consistent with the
implication oftheVAR results forNBR and TR. That is, the IRFof NBR - FF reflects the
contemporaneousrelationshipbetweenNBR and the funds rate thatis caused by the Fed’s
practice ofoffsetting demand-shockinducedchanges in borrowing.
To further investigate this possibility, consider the results forthe period 1959.01-1965.03
morecarefully. The initial liquidityeffect is very large during this period. Indeed, it is larger
than that estimatedduring the period 1965.04-1984.06. Why is the initial response so large?
The answer is revealedin Figure 9, which shows tIFFand LIBR over this period. The increased
variability of tIFFrelativeto movementin LIBR during the early l960s results in a very large
estimateof (, and consequently, a very large estimate of ?o. To illustrate how sensitive the least
squares estimates of( are to the increased variability oftIFF, rolling regression estimates of~ for
a window sizeof 10 are also presented. While thereis only a small tendency forborrowing to
vary directly with the funds rate, thelarge movements in tIFFresult in a large estimateof ~ over
this period, 1.80. Nevertheless, this parameter is imprecisely estimated and, consequently, so is
the corresponding IRF.
To further demonstrate that the IRF forNBR depends critically on the relationship
between LIBR and tIFF,hypothetical borrowedreserves data, HBR, areconstructed using the
equation:
27The variability ofBR andNBR was very small during this period. Hence, when the IRF is
normalized by thestandard deviation ofNBR, even the initial effect is relatively small, at about
six basis points.The Federal Reserve’s Operating Procedure,Nonborrowed Reserves, Borrowed Reserves and the Liquidity
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HBR1
= .50 + .35(FF1
- DR1) , (20)
fortheperiod 1965.04-1996.12. Thesedata arepresentedin Figure 10, along with BR. Note that
HBR approximates BR fairly well up to about 1984. The hypothetical datagenerated by Equation
20 inducesa positive association between borrowingand the fundsrate. However, the variability
oftIFFhas beenrelatively low since 1984.07, so HBR is capable ofinducing only a relatively
weak relationship betweenLIHNBR [HNBR = TR - HBR} and IXFF.28 A stronger relationship can
be induced by adding:
HBR1i = iiAFF1, 0 < ~t < 1 , (21)
to HBR.
The effect ofmaking borrowingvary withthe funds rateis demonstrated in Figure 11,
which shows the IREs for NBR -‘ FF for the period 1984.07-1996.12 for actualNBR and for the
three hypothetical series: the one based on Equation 20, HNBR, and on two others, HNBR25 and
HNBR5O, obtainedfrom Equation 20 plus Equation 21, with ~t = 0.25 and0.50, respectively.
Because ofthe relative stabilityoftIFFsince 1984, using Equation 20 aloneresults in a
“liquidity effect” that is only modestly largerthan that forNBR. When a stronger relationship
between tIHBR and tIFFis induced, an IRF emergesthat is more similar to those estimated over
the 1965.04-1979.09 and 1965.04-1984.06 periods. The stronger relationship between tIHBR
28BecausetIHBR is determinedby tIFFand thevariance oftIFFis relatively small during this
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and tIFF,the largeris the estimated“liquidity effect.”29
The dependence ofthe IRF on the variabilityof tIFFis partoftheexplanation ofPagan
and Robertson’s (1995) finding that the period 1979-82 is soimportant. During this period the
variance oftIFFwas very largeby historical standards. Borrowing was also very responsive to
changes in thefunds rate. The marked rise in the variance oftIFF, coupledwith the interest
sensitivity ofborrowing, gave rise to a strong positive contemporaneous relationship between
ABR andtIFF. Thecritical factor, however, was that the Fed had a stronger incentive to offset
changes in borrowingduring this period.
6. Nonborrowed Reserves Targeting
The strong negative contemporaneous relationship between NBR and BR, the factthat the
significant negative IRE of NBR -* FFappears and disappearswith therelationship between BR
and FF and the lack of a significant IRFwhen TR is used pointto the conclusion that the
contemporaneous relationshipbetweenNBR andFF is due to Fed responding to demand-shock
inducedchanges in borrowingand not to the liquidity effect. Additional evidence can be
29Similar results can be obtained using Equation 20 and by simply increasing the high-
frequencyvariation ofthe funds rate. This can be done by creatinga hypothetical series forthe
funds rate:
HFF1
= FF, + Orb,
where 11 is distributed Normal (0, 1). When 0 is chosen sothat the variance ofLIHFF is equal to
thevariance oftIFF over the period 1965.04-1984.06, the IRFfortheHNBR has an initial effect
that is nearly identical to that ofthe 1965.04-1984.06period. However, adding randomnoise,
that is uncorrelated with theother variables in the system, to thefunds ratesignificantly increases
the residual variance ofthe funds rateequation in the VAR, so theresulting IRFs are
insignificant. Moreover, noise knocks out the serial dependencein tIFF, so that the estimated
IRFs return to zero very quickly. Therelationshipbetweenborrowing and the fundsrate is
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obtained by carefullyexamining Fed operationsduring the periodofnonborrowedreserves
targeting.3°This period is important forestimates ofthe IREofNBR — FF. Moreover, since the
Fed wastargetingnonborrowed reserves, it might seemthat it would have no reason to offset
changes in borrowing. But this was not the case.3’
TheFed’s objective oftheNBR operating procedure was moneystock control [e.g.,
Gilbert and Trebing (1981), SpindtandTarhan (1987), Meulendyke (1990) and Strongin and
Tarhan (1990)]. The FOMC’s objective for money growth, combined withthe staff’s estimate of
the money multiplier, generated a path for TR. Thepath forNBR was obtained by subtracting the
IBA. The Desk adjustedthe paths forTR andNBR in unison when the FOMC changed its money
growth objective orwhen the staff revisedits multiplier estimate. In addition, the Desk made
frequent adjustments to thepath forNBR independentofthe pathfor TR. Such adjustments were
equivalent to changingthe IBA.
30The precise date when the Fed switchedfrom a NBR operating procedure to a BR operating
procedure is unknown, but it is clearthat nonborrowed reserves targeting hadended by October
1982.
31Laggedreserve accountingwas in effect during this period. Consequently, reserve demand
was determinedby deposit liabilitiesheld previously. When theFed reducedreserves through
open market operations, it was thoughtthat banks would beforcedto the discount window to
meet theirreserverequirements. Because banks are reluctant to borrow from the Fed, discount
windowborrowingincreases only when interest rates have risen sufficiently, relative to the
discountrate, so that the pecuniary advantagefrom discount windowborrowingoffsets banks’
reluctance to borrow. Hence,if theFed reduces NBR sufficiently, the federal funds rate and bank
borrowing increase simultaneously.
The evidencepresentedthus far is generally inconsistent with this interpretation. In
particular, therelationship betweenNBR and the funds rate disappearswhen banksdecided to
stay away from the discountwindow. This isjust the opposite ofwhat this explanation suggests.
Indeed, the more reluctant banks are to borrow, the larger should be the increase in the funds rate
that is required to get banks to the discount window.The Federal Reserve’sOperating Procedure, Nonborrowed Reserves, Borrowed Reserves and the Liquidity
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Becausethe objective wasmonetary control, the incentiveto offset deviations ofTR from
its path wasparticularly strong under the nonborrowedreserves operating procedure.
Unchecked, such deviations would causemoney to deviate from its desired path. This is true
regardless ofthe source ofthe deviation. When borrowing washigherthan expected, theDesk
couldeither offset borrowing, therebymissing its path forNBR on the low side, reduce its NBR
pathorovershoot its money stock objective. Ifborrowing was lower thanexpected, the Desk
couldeither offset borrowing, therebymissing its path forNBR on the high side, raise its NBR
pathorundershoot its money stock objective. The Desk was awareofthis “dilemma” and faced
it frequently.32 On some occasions the Desk adjustedits nonborrowed reserves path and on
others itsimply chose to miss it. Theinstances whenthe Deskfaced this dilemma and chose to
miss the FOMC-directed money stock target appear to be rare. Sincethe effect ofeither ofthe
first two courses ofaction arethe sameforopen market operations, it is not clear whyone course
ofaction was chosen on some occasions and the othercourse chosen on others.
In any event, an analysis ofFed documents makes itclear that the Fed madefrequent
adjustments to its initial borrowing assumption in response to unexpectedly high orlow
borrowing. Figure 12 presents theinitial borrowing assumption and actual weeklyborrowing
over theperiod February 7, 1980 to September 30, 1982 obtained from Desk’s weeklyReportof
Open Market Operations and MoneyMarket Conditions.33 During this 33-
32Federal Reserve Bank ofNew York (1981, p. 65).
33The initial borrowing assumption is the differencebetween the total reserves path and
nonborrowed reserves pathfrom theweeklyReportof OpenMarketOperations and Money
Market Conditions. Beginning with the week endingFebruary 27, 1980, thereport included a
table indicating all changes in paths and the effectivedateofthe new path. Prior to that, theThe Federal Reserve’sOperating Procedure, Nonborrowed Reserves,Borrowed Reserves and the Liquidity
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monthperiod, theIBA was adjusted 64 times, an average ofnearlytwice a month. Moreover,
these adjustments clearly follow ratherthan leadchanges in borrowing.34
ThattheFed often adjusted its IBAin response to observed changes in borrowing is
documented in Table 3, which presents the IBA, its effective date and the stated reason forthe
change, on those occasions when the reason can be documented. Unfortunately, reasons forall
ofthe changescannot be documented. This is particularly trueearlyon, when both the procedure
and the reporting ofactivities were evolving. As both theprocedure and the reportingbecame
more routine, thedocumentation improved.
These documents suggest therewere two reasons forchangingthe initial borrowing
assumption or, alternatively and opposite, the nonborrowed reserves path. Thefirst was
deviations oftotal reserves from thetotal reserves pathconsistent with theFOMC’s money
initial borrowingassumption is only stated in thetext ofthe document, so it is impossible to tell
the precisedate that the initial borrowing assumptiontook effect. Consequently, these databegin
on February 7, 1980, the first effective datereportedin tabular form in this document. It may
also be thecase that not all ofthe changes in the initial borrowingassumption are reportedin the
tables in this document. For example, according to therecentlyreleased complete transcript of
the FOMC meetingheld on May 18, 1982, in response to a statement by GovernorWallichthat
he would opt foran initial borrowingassumption ofaround $1 billion, Chairman Volckersays,
“Abillion dollars is where we arenow in fact.” Mr. Sternlight corrects the chairman, stating that
“Thelevel implicit in thepath is a little over [$1billion]--about $1044 or $1045 million.” Yet
the last figure fortheweekly report was $l.121 billion effective on May 14, 1982. It is unclear
whethertherewas a nonborrowedreserves path adjustmentthat is not reflectedin the weekly
report orwhether Sternlight wasreferringto the level that borrowingwould have to beif the
Deskwere to hitits nonborrowedreserves path. The latterfigurewas calculated daily, but is not
the initial borrowing assumption.
34This is confirmed by simple Granger causality tests between changes in borrowing and
changes in the IBA. The null hypothesis ofno Granger causalityrunning from borrowing to the
borrowing assumptionis rejected (the F-statistic is 7.67), while thehypothesis ofno Granger
causality running from the IBA to borrowing cannotbe rejected (theF-statistic is 0.53). These
results arefora lag length ofthree. Similar results areobtained forotherlag specifications.The Federal Reserve’s Operating Procedure, Nonborrowed Reserves, Borrowed Reserves and the Liquidity
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growthobjective. The second was to offset unexpected borrowing. Hence, the impressiongiven
by, Figure 12, that the Fed madefrequentchanges to the initial borrowing assumption in
response to observed changes in borrowing,is borne out by Fed documents.
In addition to the many formal changes in the borrowing assumption to offset borrowing,
there were manyinstances where theDesk simply chose to undershoot orovershoot its
nonborrowedreserves pathto offset unexpectedly strong orweak discount window borrowing.
Such instances aremuch moredifficultto document, but in its summaryof Desk operations
during 1980, the Fed acknowledged this tendency:
“The tendencyfor nonborrowedreserves to come out belowpath
largely reflectedthebehaviorofborrowing over theyear which
more often ranabove rather than belowexpectations, especially
during periods ofrising interest rates. Insteadofallowing a huge
excessat theend ofstatement weeks, theDesk attimes deliberately
chose to undershoot its weekly nonborrowedreserve objective. ~
That the Desk did this on a number ofoccasions in 1981 and 1982 is documented in the New
YorkFed’s annual summaries ofDeskoperations forthose years.36 Indeed,therewere several
instances whenthe Fed changed the initial borrowing assumption and offset the excess
borrowing. For example, during May 1981, the Fed increased its borrowingassumption by $205
million to offset theeffect of the unusuallylarge borrowing for the weekending May27t1’. The
change in the nonborrowedreserves pathwas insufficient because borrowingincreased to $2.9
billion over the three-day Memorial weekend. Hence, “underthese circumstances,the Desk
35Federal ReserveBank ofNew York (1981, p. 67).
36There were at leastfiveinstances in 1981 and three in 1982 when theDesk chose to miss its
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deliberately sought a level ofnonborrowed reserves forthe week that waswell below the
objective.”37 A similar eventoccurred in January of 1982. Despiteadjusting the initial
borrowingassumption upward by a total $303 million in three successive moves in January,
borrowingroseabove the Fed’sexpectations. Hence, “openmarket operations accordingly
absorbed reserves somewhat more than seasonallyover the month.”38
The tendency to offset unexpectedborrowing,either formally orinformally, is not
surprising given the Fed’s objectiveformoneygrowth. Indeed, this behavior likely accountsfor
the exceptionally strong negative relationshipbetweenchanges in nonborrowedreserves and
changes in borrowedreserves over this period,presented in Figure 13. At themonthly frequency,
the correlationbetween /JNBR andiiBR during this period is -0.90. The strong incentive to
offset changes in borrowingnaturallycarried over to theFed’sborrowedreserves operating
procedure which followed [Thornton (1988a)]. This marked increase in the incentiveto offset
borrowing under nonborrowedreserves targetinglikely accountsforthe particularly strong
correspondence between estimates of~3 and -( beginning in late 1979, presented in Figure 5.
The documentaryevidence forthis critical period is consistent with theview that the
contemporaneous relationshipbetween nonborrowedreserves and the fundsrate, which has been
interpreted asevidence ofthe liquidity effect, is in factdue to the Fed’s tendency to offset
changes in borrowingunder a variety ofintermediateoperating objectives. The nonborrowed
reserves targeting period is particularly important because largechangesin the federal funds rate
37Federal ReserveBank ofNew York(1982, p. 48).
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induced large changes in borrowingwhich the Deskoffset ratherthan miss the FOMC’s money
growth objective.
This evidence also accounts forwhy the “liquidity effect” vanished in the early 1980s.
While the Fed continued to offset borrowing,banks borrowed much less atthediscount window.
Moreover, theborrowing that took place was not motivated by the spread between the federal
fundsrate and thediscount rate as before.
7. Conclusions
Recently, a numberofresearchershave presented evidenceofa statistically significant
liquidityeffect using nonborrowedreserves in recursivestructural VARs. Modeling the Fed’s
operating procedure, I show that the negativecovariancebetween nonborrowed reserves and the
federal funds rate, that is crucial forthe evidence oftheliquidity effect in suchrecursive
structural VARs, canbe due to either the liquidityeffect ortheFed’s practiceofoffsetting bank
borrowing.
The Fed hasan incentive to offset borrowed reserves under a variety ofoperating
objectives. Consequently, it is not surprising that theevidence indicates that the Fed has offset
most borrowingsince 1959. This finding is consistent with historical analysesof theFed’s
operating procedures [Meulendyke (1990) and Strongin (1995)].
In addition, consistent withthe Fedresponding endogenously to demand shocks, I find
that the contemporaneousrelationship betweennonborrowed reserves and the funds rate varies
directly with banks’ useofthediscount window. There is a strong negativeassociation between
nonborrowed reserves and thefunds rateover periods when thereis a strong positive association
between borrowingand the funds rate, and no relationship whenbanks decide to shun theThe Federal Reserve’s Operating Procedure, Nonborrowed Reserves,Borrowed Reserves andthe Liquidity
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discount windoworwhen borrowing is not interest sensitive.
Indeed, evidenceofthe “liquidity effect” in the VAR is strongest during theperiodof
nonborrowed reserves targeting, when the Fed’s incentiveto offset changes in borrowingwas
particularly strong. Fed documents reveal that when confrontedwith borrowing that was higher
or lower than anticipated, the Desk either changed its nonborrowedreserves objective or
deliberatelymissed it. Because the fundsratewas more volatile during this period and
borrowing was interest sensitive, theFed’s practiceofoffsetting changes in borrowing induceda
particularly strong negative contemporaneous relationshipbetween nonborrowedreserves and the
federal funds rate. It is this and not the liquidityeffect that accounts forthe importanceofthe
nonborrowed reserves targeting period.39
Thatthe negative contemporaneouscovariance between nonborrowedreserves and the
federal funds rate is due to theendogenous behaviorofthe Fed also accounts forwhythe
“liquidity effect”vanished in the 1980s. Large banks, which tended to increase theirreliance on
the discount windowwhen the fundsrate increased relative to the discountrate, stopped coming
to the discount window in the mid-l980s. Although theFed continued to offset changes in
borrowing, therewas no interest sensitive borrowingto offset and, consequently, no negative
association between nonborrowed reserves and thefunds rate.
Hence, thevanishing liquidity effect [Pagan and Robertson (1995)and Christiano (1995)]
is not the result ofa fundamental,but yetunspecified, change in the Fed’s ability to influence
interest rates through open market operations. Rather, it stems from thefactthat banks,
39This conclusion also applies to other“evidence” ofa liquidity effect using nonborrowed
reserves [Thornton (1988b)].The Federal Reserve’sOperating Procedure, NonborrowedReserves, Borrowed Reserves and the Liquidity
Effect, Page 35
principallylargebanks, decided to stay away from the discount window. The question is not why
has Fed’s abilityto influence short-terminterest rates changed, but rather whydid large banks
decide to shun thediscount window? Noone knows for sure,but Clouse’s (1992, 1994)
explanation,that largebanks were concerned that being seen at the discountwindow might raise
questions about theirsoundness, would seemto be part ofthe answer.
Finally, there is no evidence ofa liquidity effect in therecursive structural VAR using
total reserves. This result is disturbing giventheprominenceofthe liquidityeffect in most
paradigmsofthe monetary policy transmissionmechanism.4°Whatever accounts forthis result,
it is not because total reserves reflects only shocks to demand,as Strongin (1995) and Bernanke
and Mihov (1997ab) suggest. An analysis ofthereserve market and the Fed’soperating
procedureshows that total reserves necessarily reflect supply shocks. Consequently, either there
is no liquidity effect or innovations to total reserves reflect both policy and non-policyshocks. It
appears that identifying policy shocksfrom innovations to total reserves will be difficult,
requiring aconsiderably more detailedstructural analysis ofthereserve market. The analysis
presented here shows that particularcare willhave to be givento modeling the institutional
structure ofthe Fed’s operating procedure.
401t is the case, however, that the liquidityeffect has been elusive. See Pagan and Robertson
(1995), Thornton (1988b) and Reichenstein (1987) for surveys ofthe evidence. Theexceptions
areCochrane (1989), who finds some evidence ofa liquidity effect for some time periods using
broadermonetary aggregates, Hamilton (1997), who finds that the federal funds rate responds
significantly to unanticipatedTreasury balances, but only on reservesettlements days.The Federal Reserve’s Operating Procedure, Nonborrowed Reserves, Borrowed Reserves and the Liquidity
Effect, Page 36
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APPENDIX
This appendix presents the reducedform expressions for TR, iTand NBR. The relevant
functions are assumed to be linear, i.e.,
f(i1, x1) = — Xi~+ yx1 and BR1
= a(i/ — i1°~) +
Given theseequations and assuming thatBRAS1 = ~BR1,thereduced-form expressionsfor
i~, TR and NBR are:
if = ip[i[’ + 1(x1
- E11x1) + (l-~)a.d - (l-~)(tA)~11
+ (tA)~ +
TR1
= ljJ[_t.~..i[* + (1—~)ay)~’x1
+ wyE11x1
— (1~~)ai1’~ + (l—~)mi1
++ (l—~)a?~’v
NBR1
= lIJ[_(tA+a)i[* — ay~A’x1
+ y(t.~+a)A’E,,x1




Note that in this case, as in the previous one, the federal funds rateequals theFed’s target
plus a randomerrorif and onlyif~= 1. TR nowdepends on shocks to demand and NBR is
independent ofshocksto demandregardless ofthe value of ~. TR is independent ofdemand
shocks if and only ifa =0.Table 1: Estimates ofOperatingProcedure DeterminedAccommodation
ofBorrowed Reserves






















Adj R2 0.6472 0.6483 0.4165 0.4195
s.e. 0.1650 0.1647 0.3600 0.3590
D.W. 2.3936 2.4272 2.0438 2.0425




~= 1” 3.9618* 3.6313 0.6489 1.3688
= l’s’ 0.9713 -- 1.4094 --
= i” 0.8250 -- 0.2032 --
121 4.4451 -- 1.5625
1/ Distributed Chi Square (1)
2/ Distributed Chi Square (2).
*indicates statistical significance atthe 5 percent level.
Absolute value oft-statistics in parentheses.Table 2: The RelationshipBetween theFunds Rate and the Funds RateTarget









Adj R2 0.9994 0.9958
S.E. 0.0502 0.1460
D.W. 1.447 1.224
*Indicates statistical significance at the 5 percent level.








Feb. 7, 1980 1.250 NA
Feb. 15, 1980 1.317 NA
Feb. 29, 1980 1.650 NA
March 21
1980
2.750 Bec.ause ofuncertaintyover the demand forborrowing it was
decided to seek nonborrowed reserves cQnslstent with




2.600 reflecting...a $600 million upward adjustment...to reflect
w~aicer than expected,in demand forborrowing and a ~450
million downward adjustment...assumed to beiheamount of
emergency-type bojrowing~ by onelarg~ m~rnber bank. BB
4/l8/~0.Ketrects ~150 nujhon upward adjustment...to account





May 2, 1980 1.526 acceptance ofavcrage $251 million bonowi~g over~hpot in
first week and raising nopborrowedpathby ~T100 million in
second week to speed adjustment. DR.5/21/80
May 23, 1980 0.100 NA
June 13, 1980 0.111 NA
June20, 1980 0.100 NA
July 7, 1980 0.073 average bQrrowin~g fQrtheperiod lowered to $73 njillio~.
Shooting br $100 million on ayerage WQuld have implied
borrowing in the final w~ek of~ 1~Z mllli9n, an amount that
appeared inconsistent with Committee objectives. DR, 7/9/80
July 11, 1980 0.075 NA
Sept. 5, 1980 0.225 In li,ght ofthedifference between total reserve projecjed and
tohiIre~erv,c~ path, nonborrowedreservepath was revised down
by ~l50 million... DR. 9/10/80
19, 0.750 NA
Oct. 3, 1980 0.950 path lQwered by $200 million in light ofthe persistent strength
r?~cjp8d~to(al reserves compared to the total reserve patif.
Oct. 24, 1980 1.300 NA
Nov. 7, 1980 1.400 path was, further downwardb~ $100 million becauseofthe
strengthin total reserves. BiS, 11/14/80
Nov. 14, 1980 1.450 patb reduced by $50 million in light ofinCreased_gap between
projected total reserves and total reserves path. UK, 11/19/80
Nov. 25, 1980 1.500 NA
Dec. 1, 1980 1.670 path reducedby $J70 million...in light ofcontinuing largegap
between demandtor total reserves and path. DR, 12/3/SI)
Dec. 23, 1980 1.500 path adjqsted downward bi~l70 million in view ofcontinuing
strength in total reserves. bE, 12/12/80
Jan. 30, 1981 1.780 path lowered bj’ $280 millio~...to avoid sharp dropin
borrowing. DR 2,14/Si. Adjustment downward to reflect the
large unexpected nsein demand forborrowing in theweek
entilng January 28. BB, 1/30/81
Feb. 6, 1981 1.300 NA
43Feb. 25, 1981 1.466 path reviseddownward by an average of.$166 million












May 1, 1981 1.400 path adjusted downward another $250 million ...because total
reserves were running above target. BB, 5/15/8 1
May8, 1981 1.634 path adjusted downward by another$120 million...beçause total
reserves were continuing to ruin above target. pathadjusted
downwardby another~I15 ~millionto prevent shortfallin~
nonborrowed reserves path in weçk of”May 6 from distprting
the.subsea_uent tWQ w~kly pattis in the sameinternieeting
period. B13 5/l5J~l~ll~r million reflectingthedeliberate
accept,anc~ ofa shorttall ~nnonborro~ç~d reserves in ,theMay 6
week in view ofthe heavier-than-anticipated borrowingthat
week. DR, 5/13/81
May22, 1981 2.101 In view ofthe very h.igh weekend borrowings, itwasdecided to
allow fora shortfall if nonborrowed reserves. DR. 5/27/81
May29, 1981 2.306 path was adjusteddownwardby an ad4itio,nal $206 milliQn to
preyentth~ une.xpectedly large’bonowing in the week ofMay
27 trom distorting the nonborrowedreserve path in subsequent
weeks. BB, 7/2/si
June 19, 1981 1.800 NA
June 30, 1981 1.968 adjusteddownward by an offset,ting$168 millionto prevent
unexpectedly larg.e borrowings in the week ot June L4 from
distorting thenonborrowed reserves path... BB, 7/2/8 1
July 10, 1981 1.500 NA
Aug. 6, 1981 1.424 adjusted upwardby anoth~r $7.6 million to preventthe
unexpectedlylow borrowingsin the week ofAqgust 5 from
distorting the nonborrowed reserves path...BB, ~7i4/81
Aug. 21, 1981 1.400 NA
Oct. 9, 1981 0.850 NA
Nov. 6 1981 0.794 pathadjusted upward by $56 million because ofweakness in
total reserves. 13B, 11/13/81
Nov. 20, 1981 0.400 itwas decided to acceptborrowing shortfall in the first week
and set borrowingpv~r the remainingweeks equal to the
average forthe period. DR, 12/2/81
Dec. 28, 1981 0.300 NA
Jan. 1, 1982 0.3891~’ path adjusted,downward by $89 million to offset the unusually
large borrowing in the Jan. 6 holiday week. 1/29/82
Jan. 15, 1982 0.576” adjusteddownwardby $187 million due to strengthin total
reserves. BB, 1/29/82
Jan. 29, 1982 0.603” to maintain borrowing nearthelevel expecte,d,inthe previpqs
week...theNBRpathwas lowered by an additional $27 million.
Feb. 5, 1982 1.500 Bo,rrowing consistent with achieving thc nopborrowed reserves
objectiverose sh.arply.to about~1.5billion in the final two
week,s ofthe pQripd [six weeksendin,g Feb. 3] ~&tits Feb. 1-2
ni~ting ...The initialborrowing leveVwas continued at $1.5
billion. ‘~NY(1983, p. 46).
Feb. 26, 1982 1.600 path adjusted,downwardby $100 million to offset the unusually
largebOrrowing in the week ofFebruary 24. BB, 3/26/82
44March 5,
1982
1.500 Open niarket Qperations had adjusted to the decline in
borrowing which,...ran below path levels. To allow forthis, the
nonborrowed reserve pathwas raisedby a total o.f$80 million
and, late in the subpenodthepath was raised a bit turther because ofthe slow growthorM-2... NY (1983,p. 46).
March 12,
1982
1.479 path adjuste,dupwardby $21jnillion to offset the j~inexpectedly
low borrowing in theweek 01 March 10. BB, 3/2o/82
March 19,
1982
1.420 path adjustedupwardby $~9 millionto offset the reduced
~1emandforborrowingInthe week of March 17. BB, 3/26/82
April 2, 1982 1.150 NA
April 16,
1982
1.113 path adjusted upwardby $37 million to of,fset the reduced




May 14, 1982 1.121 path adjustedupwardby $29 millionto offset the reduced
~1emandforborrowingin theweekofMay 12. BB, 5/14/82
May21, 1982 0.800 the Committee at its May 18 mee.ting decided, to aini for a.
nonborrow~c1 reserves leyel consistent with ~800 million in
borrowingbr the week in line with the average ofthe first six
days. NY(l983, p. 50)
May28, 1982 0.8 15 path adjusted downward by $15 millionto offset the incjeased
ttemand forborrowingin theweek ofMay20. BB, 6/2~/82
June4 1982 0.830 path adjusted downward by $15 millionto offset the increased
demandfor borrowing in theweek ofJune 2. BB, 6/25/82
June 11 1982 0.861 path adjusted downward by $ 3lmillion to offset the increased
demancffor borrowingin the week ofJune 9. BB, 6/25/82
July 2, 1982 0.800 NA
July 16, 1982 0.7 15 path adjusted upwardby $85 millionaftcrtaking account ofthe
~ieneraftrend in the aggregates and existing marT~et conditions.
BB, 8/20/82
July 30 1982 0.700 path adjustment upwardby an addjtional $100 milliondue the
Weakness in total reserves. BB, 8/20/82
Aug. 13, 1982 0.639 path adjusted upwardby $61 million to reflect the
reclassification ofadjustment borr9wing 01 one bank to
extended credit during the week ofAug. 11. BB, 8/20/82
Aug. 27, 1982 0.350 NA
Sept. 10,
19~2
0.633 path adjusted downwardby $~83inillionto take account ofthe





24, 0.102 pathwas raisedby $248 millionto accommodate the acceptably
more rapid growth in money. DR, 10/6/82
Sources: DR denotes DeskReport, formally the Report on Open MarketOperations and MoneyMarket
Conditions. BB denotes the Blue Book, preparedby the Board staffbeforeeach FOMC meeting. NY
denotes the annualsummary of open market operations published by the Federal Reserve Bank ofNew
York. NA denotes that we were unable to document the reason forthe changein the initial borrowing
assumption from these sources.
li’ “As the period progressed, thenonborrowed reserve pathwas lowered in three stages by a total of
$303 million...to accommodate temporary bulges in borrowingand to speed the return ofmoney to
path.”Federal ReserveBank ofNew York (1983, p. 46).
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-LFigure 6: Seasonal and Adjustment Borrowing and the Federal
Funds Rate - Discount Rate Spread
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* Change in the Federal Funds Rate measured in percentage points.
** Change in borrowing measured in billions of dollars.
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